El Departamento de Economía de la Facultad de Economía y Empresa de la Universidad Diego Portales, tiene el agrado de invitar a usted a la presentación del paper: “Price-matching guarantees, false disclosure, and exclusion”.
Expositor: Cristián Troncoso Valverde, Universidad del Desarrollo
I examine the incentives to adopt price-matching guarantees in competitive markets in which some sellers may deliberately lie about the attributes of their products. Similar to markets in which disclosure is both credible and verifiable, the adoption of price-matching guarantees helps sellers sustain collusive prices based on the information revealed through disclosure. Nonetheless, the fact that some sellers may lie about the attributes of their products implies that some of them (those that are believed to disclose false information) are excluded from price matching, and that collusive prices are strictly lower than those that sellers could sustain should disclosure be credible and verifiable. Thus, the threat of false disclosure not only disciplines sellers’ collusive behavior but also helps explain why more reputed retailers exclude online competitors from price-matching.
JEL classi_cation: L15, D43, D83
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